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1. Introduction 
Managing the crises affecting Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has 
been top of the policy agenda for the last five years. EU member states have managed 
the fallout of the crisis and implemented reforms in emergency mode while at the same 
time laying the foundations for a more resilient system. Opinions differ on the 
effectiveness of these reforms in addressing short-term challenges, but the increasingly 
urgent question is whether they offer a lasting solution to the well-known shortcomings 
of the single currency. 
Here, we argue that EMU reform must result in a more effective form of 
integration, capable of assessing and reconciling short term actions against long term 
goals (Nicolaïdis, 2010). This is, very simply, a new governing idea of integration, 
calling for the reconfiguration of the integration process away from the old remedies of 
“deeper and faster”. Instead, EU actors should embed in institutions and procedures a 
systemic commitment to sustainable integration, defined as something that is durable, 
resilient and politically acceptable. Such an approach entails both an ethos and practice, 
a state of mind, and benchmarks for decisions by all actors involved in economic and 
policy action in the EU. It also means changing the way change occurs in the EU and 
recognizing that intergovernmental bargains need to be sustained by inter-societal and 
inter-generational bargains. 
Such an attitude chimes with principles underpinning the internet revolution, 
with its emphasis on empowerment, resilience, robustness and adaptive learning. 
Concretely, the EU should foster a sustainable integration culture and take more account 
of long term objectives in managing current problems, thereby creating the 
preconditions for later action. Sustainable integration is not about policy blueprints but 
about the negotiation of guidelines for action, linking multiple agenda and actors around 
a set of shared long-term goals.  
To make EMU sustainable, the first imperative is to acknowledge that it had 
been left incomplete at Maastricht due to divergent Member State preferences (Torres, 
2009). Expectations that these preferences would converge over time across all member 
states have been dashed and the consequences exposed by the euro crisis. Before 2008, 
there was little felt urgency to address the known frailties in EMU’s governance 
 3 
construct (see Giavazzi and Wyplosz, this issue), yet as the crisis unfolded EMU’s very 
existence was threatened. Major advances in economic governance were subsequently 
adopted, mainly driven by the short-term imperatives of system survival. The question 
now is whether they also put EMU on the path to a long-term sustainable future, defined 
in terms not just of the basics of monetary economics, but also of the viability of the 
underlying economic model and public support. 
EMU was set up as a political project in the knowledge that the EU was not an 
optimum currency area (OCA). Nevertheless, monetary union was achieved rapidly, 
with the smooth launch of the euro and the transition to the European Central Bank 
(ECB) for the conduct of monetary policy. By contrast, the economic union side – the 
‘E’ in EMU, including provisions for coordination of budgetary and structural policies – 
was left incomplete. As a result, the many interdependencies between member states of 
a currency union and higher coordination needs were neglected, while the tentative 
attempts to enhance coordination processes for economic reform (i.e. the Lisbon 
Strategy) did little to curb the large negative spillovers from the unfinished economic 
into the monetary sphere.
1
 Subsequent efforts to complete the economic union part of 
EMU have gone some way to strengthen EMU’s resilience in the face of market 
pressures. However, institutional innovation was conditioned by the needs and 
constraints of the moment: sometimes within and sometimes outside the Community 
framework; sometimes through variations on intergovernmental cooperation, sometimes 
by reverting the Community method; sometimes restricted to the Euro area level, 
sometimes extending to the EU as a whole. The result has been the creation of new 
institutions and mechanisms, at an extraordinary pace but not necessarily always with a 
view to long term sustainability. 
This article goes beyond the proposals to counter the crisis by completing EMU 
through ‘a coherent governance architecture’ or a ‘Genuine’ EMU. The latter was 
adopted in various versions of the Presidents’ Reports (European Commission, 2012, and 
Van Rompuy, 2012, Juncker 2015a and 2015b). Its building blocks are an integrated 
financial framework (mostly a banking union), an integrated budgetary framework 
                                                 
1
 Negative spillovers were rooted in factors such as unsustainable debt paths, inadequate national financial 
supervision, the feedback loop between weak banks and over-indebted sovereigns, and lower growth 
potential associated with insufficient modernization of national economies. 
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(implicitly fiscal union), an integrated economic policy framework (economic union) and 
enhanced democratic legitimacy and accountability of EMU governance (closer political 
union). 
Although some of the reform proposals under these headings can be criticized for 
going further than is needed, many are undeniably necessary and some are quite bold, but 
they will arguably not be sufficient to render EMU sustainable over the long term. In 
particular, despite the institutional resilience on display, they have largely failed to 
mobilize support from governments and citizens for sustainable European integration. 
The challenge now is to promote growth in a form compatible with fiscal consolidation 
and reduced indebtedness while at the same time ensuring long-term sustainability.  
In the end, restoring public support for EMU will depend on the delivery of 
common goals that serve the broader purpose of sustainable integration. The ECB (2015) 
recognizes that public support for the EU, especially in its EMU incarnation, will rest on 
the prospects for sustainable growth as the sine qua non for the smooth functioning of 
EMU. For that to happen, the development of the integrated economic policy framework 
building block will have to be embedded in a sustainable growth strategy, which pursues 
structural reform in a logic of modernization of national economies with ownership of 
reforms at the national level. 
The next section examines the concept of sustainable integration more closely, 
focusing on sustainable growth, approaches to modernizing national economies and the 
issue of ownership of reforms. Section 3 evaluates the progress made to date and the 
reform initiatives needed to render it sustainable. Section 4 analyses EMU governance 
in the light of sustainable integration, with reference to the above discussed properties. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Mainstream: EMU Reform and the Presidents’ Reports  
The smooth functioning of a currency union, as compared to a less ambitious economic 
union, makes additional demands on labour, product and financial markets to become 
more flexible as a means of adjusting to shocks, given that monetary policy is no longer 
available for this purpose and fiscal policy has to be constrained. Coordination of 
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national policies is, however, vital to prevent damaging spillovers from actions in one 
member state to others, weakening the overall coherence of the union’s economic 
policy. 
Efforts to create a ‘genuine EMU’ (see also Mongelli et al., this issue), have 
only led to limited progress in creating what the Four Presidents’ report (van Rompuy, 
2012) calls an “integrated economic policy framework’. Dealing with the legacy costs 
of the crisis, restoring growth and reducing imbalances, although essential, is not 
enough. Underlying competitiveness problems also need to be addressed, but moving 
the Euro area closer to an optimal, or at least sustainable, currency area requires reforms 
in areas where competencies have remained at the member state level.  
The various Presidents’ reports on EMU governance provide orientations for a 
policy framework that would not only correct many of the known flaws in EMU, but 
also anticipate future problems. Actions in four areas were set out, with a distinction 
made between short- and longer-term ambitions, providing for: 
 An integrated financial framework to ensure a financially stable system; a common 
interpretation of this pillar is banking union, and a key objective is to break the so-
called doom-loop (Gaspar, this issue) in which problems for banks become problems 
for national public finances and vice versa. 
 An integrated budgetary framework with the dual aim of assuring fiscal discipline 
and developing new, common fiscal policy instruments, measures which would steer 
the Eurozone in the direction of fiscal union, albeit one which falls well short of the 
extensive cross-regional fiscal flows found in most other monetary unions. 
 An integrated economic policy framework able to reconcile growth, employment and 
competitiveness with the sustainability of EMU, while avoiding negative spillovers 
across national borders. 
  Enhancement of democratic legitimation and channels of accountability which is 
justified particularly by the loss of national autonomy in budgetary and other 
economic matters of greater top-down constraints on national autonomy in economic 
decision-making.  
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Proposals for developing each of these building blocks were presented in a 
‘blueprint’ by the European Commission (2012), but progress has been mixed, with 
only banking union having been substantially advanced. Fiscal union has made scant 
progress since 2011 and there is, as yet, no strong sense of what will be done to improve 
legitimation, not least in relation to the enhanced powers of oversight conferred on the 
EU institutions (Schmidt, 2013). The spread of political protests and institutional 
conflicts, both within and between Member States, highlights the challenges because the 
economic governance model is one based increasingly on executive rather than 
representative power.  
In paving the way for further reforms, Juncker et al. (2015a) pose a series of 
questions about the future governance framework and, implicitly, the reform initiatives 
needed to render EMU sustainable. These questions fall into three main categories. The 
first can be summarized as asking whether the current rules and institutions are robust 
enough to prevent a recurrence of problems, and whether the mechanisms in place will 
ensure sufficient resilience against future shocks, including through structural reforms. 
A second theme is whether risk pooling, both through private and public interventions, 
can be enhanced and can forestall further episodes of financial instability. Third, the 
paper returns to one of the original four themes: the accountability and legitimacy of 
governance. Although many proposed solutions had been canvassed in the 2012 
contributions, that they are still unresolved testifies to the difficulties of completing 
EMU’s governance framework. 
The follow-ups of the Four Presidents’ report (Juncker et al., 2015a and b) 
advocate the need for an immediate strengthened commitment to growth-enhancing 
structural reforms so as to create a virtuous triangle of structural reforms, investment 
and fiscal responsibility, and a deepened single market to improve adjustment capacity. 
While these are worthy aims, they fall short of defining an economic development 
model that can guide the long-term sustainability of EMU. While we do not pretend to 
provide such a model, we aim to suggest the principles that might sustain it under the 
broad heading of sustainable integration. 
 
3. A Vision for EMU: The Three Pillars of Sustainable Integration  
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We believe that the notion of sustainable integration offers a more comprehensive 
perspective on what is needed. We suggest that in the field of EMU, it rests on three 
main pillars, namely the pursuit of sustainable growth, reform strategies adapted to the 
modernization paths of national economies and national ownership of reforms. Each of 
these pillars of sustainable integration, in turn, requires new approaches to overcome the 
shortcomings exposed by the crises. 
 
3.1. Sustainable Growth 
Sustainable growth is central to the EU’s economic narrative and is enshrined in the 
treaties as a fundamental objective. Though most often connected with environmental 
objectives, sustainable growth in the EU lexicon encompasses social and economic 
dimensions, as set out, notably, in the Europe 2020 strategy (Bongardt and Torres, 
2013). It can provide both a crisis exit strategy and a renewed long-term agenda for EU 
sustainable integration, and requires long-term commitments and necessary public 
investments (Lenschow, 2010; Sachs, 2012). 
A sustainable polity is one that endures through time and changes in 
circumstances, including shocks. The EU is future friendly, which is, somewhat 
paradoxically, the silver lining of its so-called democratic deficit or lesser direct 
accountability since institutions are less susceptible to short-term electoral concerns and 
pressures than its Member States (Nicolaïdis 2010). 
In this spirit, a durable economic recovery from the crisis starts with action 
today (ECB, 2015). However, economic growth will be neither politically nor 
economically sustainable unless environmental damage, excessive resource depletion 
and long-term, inter-generational effects are internalized, while engendering greater 
resilience to natural hazards (Hallegatte et al., 2011). Combatting climate change by 
accelerating de-carbonization can, through well-designed policies, have positive growth 
effects in the short and long run – see for instance Fay et al. (2015), Nordhaus (2006), 
Spence (2014), Stern (2006, 2015). A call for ‘whatever kind of growth’ risks ignoring 
the economic case for environmentally and socially sustainable solutions.  
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Critically, the environment sector has managed to create employment since the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2009, notwithstanding the fact that in the approach towards 
sustainable growth, soft coordination has so far failed to realize the innovation, 
competitiveness and growth potential that it promises (EEA, 2015).
2
 A more systematic 
look at the transmission mechanism between the completion of the single market and 
Europe 2020 strategy is warranted (European Commission, 2010).  
Progress towards sustainable growth therefore hinges on decision-making for the 
long term and on an economy capable of flexible adjustment with an innovation-
friendly business environment, given that it involves both structural change within the 
economy and in society and a long-term oriented governance system (Pearce and 
Turner, 1990: 24; Randers, 2012). Policies and instruments that are consistent with 
long-term objectives need to provide the right incentives while minimizing possible 
short-term trade-offs between environmental protection and growth. However, the 
governance of sustainable growth relevant areas is piecemeal and methods and 
enforcement possibilities vary significantly and relies on soft coordination processes 
(typically, characterized by sweeping ambitions, but a dearth of disciplining tools). 
These included the Lisbon (2000-10) and Sustainable Development strategies (2001, 
revised in 2006), before coming together in the Europe 2020 (2011-20) strategy. 
Diverse governance methods are not intrinsically a problem, but the EU still lacks a 
coherent strategy for sustainable growth. As a result, and although the EU 
environmental sector expanded and created employment since 2008 in the midst of the 
crisis, its full potential remains to be exploited (EEA, 2015). 
 
3.2. Varieties of Modernization  
Although monetary union enjoyed a benign first decade, the slow pace of 
national reforms in some member states and the incapacity of financial markets to 
distinguish between Eurozone sovereigns contributed to growing intra-EMU 
                                                 
2
 The objective of sustainable development was not well integrated in the Lisbon Strategy on growth and 
employment. The Europe 2020 strategy’s green growth objective is based on climate targets (the 2007-9 
climate energy package), which have become insufficiently ambitious to promote innovation and 
investment with the crisis-induced downturn in economic activity. 
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macroeconomic imbalances. EMU’s governance institutions were unable to encompass 
increasing policy interdependence, let alone capable of dealing with the effects of the 
crises. Monetary union brought about a qualitative change in the economic context, 
resulting, on the economic side, in unsustainable tensions.  
Different EU states have followed different paths to modernization in terms of 
their socio-economic make up, the attributes of their states, their state-society relations, 
their social and institutional traditions as well as the distribution of costs and benefits 
and the obstacles stemming from modernization dynamics. These varieties in turn 
determine the fit between the requirements of EMU and the country or countries in 
question. 
Since the publication of the 1993 ‘Delors’ white paper on growth 
competitiveness and employment, the EU has launched a series of initiatives intended to 
bolster structural reforms within its member states. Their common objective has been to 
strengthen the EU’s and individual countries’ competitiveness in a world characterized 
by new realities and challenges, such as globalization, the information society, 
demographic ageing, climate change or enlargement. For example, the Lisbon Strategy 
highlighted the imperative of advancing the EU as a knowledge economy in tandem 
with building a socially more cohesive society. Despite having wide-ranging goals, the 
strategy lacked a specific EMU dimension and thus did not take enough account of how 
different progress on structural change affected other euro area members. Although the 
Europe 2020 strategy sought to be more comprehensive, it has faded from view during 
the crisis years and has been supplanted by the much more short-term semester process. 
A possible explanation is that the instruments for policy coordination were not 
always differentiated enough to take into account the varieties of modernization faced 
across member states. On the fiscal side, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was 
flouted (most notoriously, by France and Germany in 2002/3), without a reckoning as to 
what its limitations were and how to accommodate the evident need for flexibility in the 
governance design itself. The resort to the open method of coordination (OMC) to 
engineer domestic reform had very differentiated success across states, suggesting that 
relying on tools such as benchmarking or best practice was insufficiently reinforced by 
public and peer pressure (Bongardt and Torres, 2012). Analysts can disagree as to 
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whether the culprit was the absence of binding and/or enforceable rules (in the Lisbon 
Strategy and in the SGP), only limited financial market pressure or, alternatively, the 
insufficient attention to the need for domestic institutions and habitus that would 
internalize externalities (Nicolaïdis and Watson, 2015). What is clear however is that 
EMU was ill adapted to the kind of social, political and economic heterogeneity 
prevalent among Eurozone countries. 
The sovereign debt crisis highlighted the large negative spillovers from 
economic divergences and the urgency of more systematic reform affecting policy 
domains with divisive political and distributional effects, in and between member states. 
The Euro Plus Pact (2011) subsequently introduced an EMU dimension to economic 
reforms, but had little impact due to its weak (intergovernmental, non-binding) method. 
Similarly, a Compact for Growth and Jobs was established in 2012, but has had few 
visible effects. Proposals to incentivize reforms in member states through contracts were 
abandoned when nearly all member states rejected them at the December 2013 
European Council. 
A new impetus has been given to reforms and their relevance has grown in a 
context where fiscal policy is also constrained due to the need for an enduring 
correction of budgetary imbalances (Bini-Smaghi, this issue). Taxation instruments –
including environment related – can once again supplement tighter regulation as 
European countries slowly exit from crisis management. There has been an acceleration 
of structural reforms in laggard countries as a result of market and peer pressure and of 
formal and informal conditionality (Schmieding and Schulz, 2014; OECD, 2015). Yet, 
enforcing conditionality while at the same completing EMU’s governance framework is 
a perilous exercise for political legitimacy (Nicolaïdis and Watson, 2015). 
 
3.3. Democratically Sustainable Reforms  
The crisis has highlighted the need for citizens’ political ownership of both reforms 
undertaken in their own countries and of the European integration project as a whole, in 
response to questions such as ‘why (more) Europe?’ or ‘sacrifices in the name of what?’ 
To the extent that institutional limits to integration come to constrain the capacity to 
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resolve European common concerns, without a democratization of reforms, the long-
term political sustainability of the European project is in doubt. 
The choice of the OMC ostensibly reflected a perceived need for ownership of 
reforms (as a process of slow-moving and bottom-up convergence of preferences on 
institutions) and the notion of convergence as a gradual, learning process. The approach 
was intended to foster reforms tailored to member states’ heterogeneous situations and 
preferences, yet the EMU process largely failed to foster true ownership of reforms in 
line with the member states’ own modernization goals. The fact that member states’ 
political systems (governments, oppositions and even social partners) may have agreed 
to EMU-sustaining reforms in the 1990s and committed to them under the Lisbon 
Strategy (2000-10) during EMU’s first decade did not prevent many of them – to 
differing degrees - from backsliding and thus putting at risk their respective welfare 
states and the quality of life. 
In the process, the question of the collective acceptance of EMU’s redistributive 
implications has become more politicized.
3
 This is in part due to the increased resort to 
executive decisions in economic governance, leading to significant divergences and 
political conflicts, both among and within Member States, as well as between them and 
supranational EU institutions, which have tended to be bypassed by intergovernmental 
or even bilateral bargaining. Many old conflicts about the ideal configuration of EMU, 
including within the European System of Central Banks and the ECB, have resurfaced. 
Clearly, EMU reforms cannot be sustainable if what they impose on individual member 
states is not democratically sustainable, both in terms of the electorate and in terms of 
the political leadership. Formerly vague references to European rules in national 
political debates have become more explicit constraints, better understood by citizens, 
thereby reducing the opacity of domestic political and policy processes and potentially 
raising policy effectiveness. But the visibility of constraints also leads to their 
contestation when they are perceived as sacrificing domestic democracy and autonomy 
(Rodrik, 2011). Ideally, “fiscal disciplines” enforced from Brussels will be 
                                                 
3 De Wilde and Zürn (2012) suggest that crises have a strong bearing on the acceptability of greater 
politicization in EU integration.  
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progressively replaced by political “commitments” in line with shared rules and 
expectations – admittedly, a tall order. 
 
4. Progress and Pitfalls: Towards a Sustainable EMU? 
The flaws in EMU’s governance framework exposed by the sovereign debt crisis have 
been examined in a growing number of critical papers which exhibit a fair degree of 
consensus on the broad directions for reforms needed to render EMU sustainable (see 
for example: Eichengreen, 2014; De Grauwe, 2013, De Grauwe and Ji and Giavazzi and 
Wyplosz, this issue; Juncker et al., 2015a). In parallel, rapid (by EU standards) 
agreement since 2010 on a range of measures to strengthen fiscal discipline and 
economic coordination has dealt with some of the acknowledged shortcomings. These 
responses, together with the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a 
permanent rescue fund, new arrangements for financial regulation and supervision and 
better tools for macro-prudential supervision, arguably reduce the risk of future crises 
and strengthen the capacity for crisis management. But how do these measures fare 
against the three pillars of sustainable integration for EMU suggested above? 
First and most broadly, greater macroeconomic stability calls for the recasting of 
EMU governance and its embedding within a broader set of instruments meant to 
promote sustainable growth. Efforts to promote growth and jobs through the Europe 
2020 strategy and the Compact for Growth and Jobs have had little obvious impact, 
while it remains to be seen how successful the Juncker Commission’s flagship idea of a 
new European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), with its headline target of €315 
billion of new investment, will be (see Claeys, 2015, for a sceptical view). Second, by 
disallowing either Euro-exit or a credible threat of default, and in the absence of a 
common fiscal stance, the functioning of EMU neglects the possible divergences 
resulting from distinctive national pathways to and progress on modernization.  
 Nor does the Five Presidents’ report of June 2015 inspire confidence that what is 
in the pipeline will be sufficiently transformative to address these pitfalls. Although the 
report calls for a new ‘fiscal stabilisation function’, it has apparently jettisoned the idea 
of a euro area budget for stabilization purposes. Since 2012, little progress has been 
made on risk pooling as a form of fiscal union. Unsurprisingly, creditor countries resist 
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calls for jointly and severally guaranteed Eurobonds; indeed, the very term Eurobond 
has become unmentionable in some Member States (Matthijs and McNamara, 2015). 
There is still no easy means of arriving at an aggregate Eurozone-wide fiscal stance, 
despite extensive debate on the matter, which precludes agreeing an appropriate 
macroeconomic policy mix as a facet of economic sustainability.  As various 
contributors to this issue also argued, it is necessary to tackle both the current need to 
stimulate domestic demand in surplus countries and the implementation of structural 
reforms to reduce built-up disequilibria in deficit countries. The link between fiscal 
policy and structural reforms is not irrelevant as the former is constrained by the need to 
ensure a proper adjustment of the budgetary imbalance and the latter can increase the 
credibility of the adjustment programme and thereby achieve a more gradual fiscal 
adjustment (Bini-Smaghi). 
Moreover, perhaps for reasons of institutional and constitutional propriety, the 
report fails to encompass developments in the governance of monetary policy, such as 
the de facto recognition that the ECB has to be a lender of last resort or intervene in 
sovereign bond market in ways that have fiscal policy impacts potentially affecting 
growth prospects by lowering debt servicing costs (De Grauwe and Ji, this issue). While 
the establishment of the ESM fills a gap in emergency funding for Member States in 
(temporary) difficulty, it is less clear that there is adequate provision for the sort of 
comprehensive crisis management of an adjustment programme provided by the IMF.  
More positively, banking union is the area that has made the most progress, and 
which can support all three of the pillars of sustainable integration. But common deposit 
insurance rapidly fell off the agenda (then restored by the Five Presidents), while the 
provisions on a single resolution mechanism may be too limited to break the ‘doom-
loop’ between banks and sovereigns soon. It will take a decade for the new resolution 
fund to reach its intended level, so that a new ‘bridging’ facility advocated by the Five 
Presidents will be a useful reinforcement of banking union. Proposals for a capital 
markets union are ambitious (Véron, 2014), but financial market fragmentation and 
difficult credit conditions, which are deterring recovery and growth prospects, are not 
adequately addressed as long run challenges. Some imbalances other than of public 
finances cannot easily be curbed. The macroeconomic imbalances procedure is, in 
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principle, a means of doing so, but appears to be unable to deal with excessive external 
surpluses (Bini Smaghi; De Grauwe and Ji, this issue). The resulting asymmetry 
between deficit and surplus countries further deepens the challenge of political 
ownership of reform. 
Although more extensive mechanisms for imposing discipline on member states 
have been introduced, potentially improving the economic sustainability of EMU, the 
strategic and political dimensions of sustainable integration are still in doubt. More 
broadly, while there has been a heated debate around austerity (Blyth, 2012; Bini 
Smaghi, 2013) and whether a disciplining approach is misguided (Nicolaïdis and 
Watson, 2015), too little attention has been paid to the longer run determinants of 
growth and its quality (sustainable growth) or the appropriateness of EU approaches.  
While the Presidents are persuasive in their reports in arguing that excessive 
debts constrain growth, EMU sustainability cannot be restricted to budget responsibility 
but requires more, particularly through sustainable growth. The question then is how to 
promote sustainable growth given budgetary constraints and a one-fits-all monetary 
policy. A fiscal stimulus is a crude instrument that does not necessarily result in 
‘quality’ growth, unless it deals with the causes of competitiveness problems. Incentives 
for growth can be provided not only through the level, but also (perhaps more 
importantly) the composition of expenditure and incentives on the revenue side, notably 
taxation (Giavazzi and Wyplosz, this issue). Monetary policy can dampen cyclical 
shocks but cannot solve structural problems. Structural reforms are therefore important 
not only for EMU resilience but also for higher potential growth (Draghi 2015) and 
hence for dealing with the legacy costs of the crisis, so that for EMU to be a sustainable 
form of integration, new approaches to coordination will be needed. This is recognized 
in general terms in the Five Presidents’ report, but its prescriptions are disappointingly 
tame.  
The dilemma is that growth-enhancing structural reforms are slow to act, even if 
they are desirable in the long run (IMF, 2015), and often impose immediate budgetary 
costs, while causing frictions with a high political cost when they collide with 
entrenched interest groups or affect vulnerable social groups. Hence, sequencing matters 
in assessing the political sustainability of structural reforms: those that are growth 
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enhancing in the short run should be prioritized, and private investment encouraged in 
ways compatible with fiscal constraints and incentives (Pisani-Ferry, 2014). However, if 
we are to tinker with fiscal instruments we should create the right incentives for long-
term stability at the same time. The use of fiscal instruments opens up the perspective of 
promoting sustainable growth by shifting taxation on to inefficiencies (pollution), and 
away from taxing productive factors (labour). This requires in turn enough coordination 
among states to forestall a race to the bottom on corporate taxation, which in the last 20 
years has hollowed out the tax base across European states (Piketty, 2014). Also, 
subsidies like the ones on coal and other fossil fuels should be abolished as they 
encourage their use, which is in conflict with trying to curb CO2 emissions besides 
increasing budgetary expenditures and distorting incentives and competition (IEA, 
2014). Moreover, astute regulation can foster private green investments without 
incurring fiscal expenditure and provide a push for EU green innovation and cost-
efficiency. The circular economy package – an approach to resource use that builds-in 
recovery, recycling and regeneration as fundamental components of economic 
management – is a case in point where demanding EU regulation can promote 
innovation and cost efficiency and hence growth and employment creation rather than 
red tape (EEA, 2015). Unfortunately, it seems that the new Commission has scrapped 
this package at least for the time being. Similarly, the EFSI’s results (and impact on 
EMU’s sustainability) will depend on whether the projects are chosen for their 
contribution to long-term sustainable growth. 
As the integrated economic coordination framework has barely advanced, the 
Five Presidents’ report (Juncker et al., 2015b) proposes to underpin national reform 
efforts via competitiveness authorities at the national level and, in a second phase, 
through a legal base for commitments. While these could help, the Europe 2020 strategy 
(not mentioned in the report) ought also to be revived, especially in view of its 
prescription for long-term competitiveness alongside long-term environmental and 
social concerns. But much will depend, as so often, on the approach adopted to 
competitiveness. The proposal by the Five Presidents that commitments should become 
binding in the second phase suggests that they have little faith in the delivery of national 
structural reform through non-binding coordination. It remains to be seen whether such 
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a binding character is compatible with the kind of democratically sustainable character 
of reform discussed above. 
The model of conditionality could be complemented with an integrated 
economic policy framework (Sapir and Wolff, 2015). Such an alternative is not without 
risks because European institutions may be perceived as inflicting austerity and 
discouraging growth, a narrative that has often been heard in Greece, though also 
elsewhere. However, it would in turn strengthen ownership of structural reforms and 
new institutions by the public that reflect the need for ‘multiple but connected national 
politics’ to manage more fruitfully the democratic interdependence stemming from 
monetary union (Nicolaïdis 2013: 352). They can also increase the acceptance of 
economic reforms against the background of wider benefits from EU integration. 
 
5. Conclusion: Towards EU Sustainable Integration? 
The sovereign debt crisis has exposed flaws in the governance framework of EMU that 
were partially remedied, most emphatically in the area of banking union, arguably 
reducing the risk of future crises and strengthening the capacity for crisis management. 
The principal challenges now to sustainable integration are, on the one hand, to 
strengthen economic coordination of the structural reforms needed to render EMU more 
resilient and to restore growth to the top of the political agenda; on the other, for 
integration to be sustainable, citizens have to be convinced that EMU is working for 
them.  
A lack of national ownership and the conditionality of structural reforms have 
led to greater politicization, putting into question the collective acceptance hitherto of 
their redistributive implications. Political protests and institutional conflicts have 
marked the Eurozone in the last five years. Those frictions offer the EU an opportunity 
to address what we consider to be its greater challenge: pursuing a path of sustainable 
integration, grounded in enhanced societal capacity and propensity to act for the long 
term.  
The sustainable integration paradigm offers a long-term vision for the EU 
integration project in the crisis context and beyond. To kick-start it, sustainable growth 
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can be the basis for an exit strategy from the crisis in the shorter term (complementing 
the financial integration discussed by Jones in this issue), and a prerequisite for a 
smooth functioning of EMU in the long term which would bring about wider benefits 
from EU integration for EU citizens. But there is a long way to go. The EU approach to 
sustainable growth is piecemeal and driven by the artificially separate realm of “climate 
policy”, with a recent boost under the heading of the Energy Union. As yet, it falls short 
of a coherent development strategy for sustainable growth. 
Within such a sustainable integration logic, EU actors must engage in a 
continuous discussion on the relationship between short-term actions and long-term 
objectives. This process, if properly implemented, and aligned with citizens’ priorities 
can contribute not only to the sustainability of EMU per se, but to the wider political 
sustainability of the European integration project as a whole. 
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